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The study reported on in this publication is conducted in the framework of the Flemish Policy 
Research Centre on Foreign Affairs, International Entrepreneurship and Development 
Cooperation. The centre’s research is structured in four thematic pillars: (i) International and 
European Law; (ii) International and European Policy; (iii) International Entrepreneurship; and 
(iv) Development Cooperation. As part of the fourth pillar, which is coordinated by the Research 
Institute on Work and Society (HIVA), a medium term research project on the role of the private 
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1 |  Introduction 
The private sector is assigned growing importance as an actor in development. This is an 
uncontested observation yet a contested trend. Development actors - including the private 
sector itself - are experimenting with building bridges between business and global 
development. At the same time a debate on how to ensure the compatibility of a business 
rationale with development objectives is still ongoing. This straddle also marks the current policy 
and practice of development cooperation. Multilateral and bilateral development agencies, non-
governmental development organisations (NGDOs), and corporations are busy cutting out an 
active role for business in development cooperation. At the same time questions on the 
legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness of the private sector as a development actor remain 
unsettled. In the plethora of existing and emerging strategies and modalities that involve the 
private sector, and the questions and critiques surrounding these policies and practices, one 
easily fails to see the wood for the trees. 
Research scope 
With due reason the Flemish policy research centre’s fourth pillar on development cooperation 
puts forward as a central research question: What are the most important developments, 
modalities and good practices regarding the role and involvement of the private sector in 
addressing global development problems? 
The first phase of the research focused on 2 sub-questions: 1) What views exist on the role of 
private sector in development and development cooperation, and how has this evolved over 
time? 2) What main strategies are bilateral donors deploying in their interaction with the private 
sector? What general lessons can be learned so far, especially where private sector engages in 
‘development’ in a way that goes beyond its mainstream business activity? The research report 
discussed how private sector has always played a part in development cooperation, but how 
current private sector is being perceived and approached as a development actor in its own right 
that can and should contribute actively to addressing development challenges. The report 
identified the diverse roles private sector can play in development cooperation. It also 
summarized and illustrated some differences in donor policies regarding the private sector’s role 
in development cooperation, and briefly explored what instruments aimed at implementing 
these policies are in use. Finally, a look into the Flemish development policy and current practice 
showed the absence of clear policy on whether and how to engage with the private sector, 
whereas Flanders in its cooperation with South Africa in fact already explores interaction with 
the private sector in many different roles.  
 
The second phase of this research picks up where the first left of: with the observation that in 
the case of Flanders in South Africa, but actually also of many other donors, the current 
interactions with private sector happen at least partially in a policy vacuum, with no clear 
principles and operational guidelines on cooperation with the private sector, and through the 
use of a variety of instruments. Digging into three cases of specific instruments, policy guidelines 
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or projects, the study aims to gain insight in what works for whom in a specific context and 
investigate this from a small donor perspective. This can be seen as a first step to tap into the 
experiences and insights available ‘in the field’ in South Africa and to extract insights that can 
feed further policy development processes. 
Methodology & outline 
Methodologically, the study took a case study approach, assuming that an up-close and in-depth 
investigation of a specific case in its specific context could deliver insights into what possible 
approaches to engaging with the private sector exist and what inherent as well as contextual 
factors determine success or failure. We opted for a holistic multi-case design, with three cases 
each addressing a different type of challenge and involving a different set of actors.  
The case study was grounded in evidence collected through different sources: direct 
observations, semi-structured in-depth interviews with key experts, document analysis, 
participant-observation and literature review. Part of the data collection happened during field 
work in South Africa in March 2015. Data collected in the first research stage, including the 
exploratory field work in June 2014 and interviews throughout the second half of 2014, was also 
taken into account. One important lacuna is that the data collection did not target private sector 
representatives. The research takes the perspective of development agencies, although it also 
considers the role of the private sector in development beyond any facilitation by or interaction 
with official development cooperation.  
 
This report starts with a brief restatement of the key concepts and the private sector role 
typology developed in the first research phase (chapter 2), and used both as a stepping stone 
for the analysis of the cases. At the core of the report is the discussion of three case studies and 
the search for interesting insights and lessons that can be distilled from each individual case 
(chapters 3, 4, 5). The final chapter explores whether the whole is more than the constituting 
parts and attempts to uncover interesting avenues for the Flemish development cooperation as 





2 |  Toolkit for case analysis 
2.1 Roles for private sector in development cooperation 
Current official development policies at all levels show a clear tendency to emphasize the role 
of the private sector as a key actor in development and, 
increasingly so, in development cooperation. However, 
observers point out that the ‘private turn’ in development 
cooperation may not be as novel as the buzz around it 
seems to insinuate. In many ways it is in line with 
dominant development theory, and a continuation of the 
(cyclical) negotiation of the triangular relationship 
between state, private sector and citizens (Berthoud 2010; 
Nederveen Pieterse 2010; Kindornay and Reilly-King 2013; 
Eurodad and CRBM 2011).  
 
However, some observers also point out that the current 
‘private turn’ might be more than just the pendulum 
swerving once more (van Tulder and Fortanier 2009; 
Eurodad and CRBM 2011; Byiers and Rosengren 2012). 
One new feature would be the tendency of attributing 
enterprises an active role, and therefor responsibility, as 
key actors in development.  
 
To differentiate between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ role of 
private sector in development, the terms private sector 
development (PSD) and private sector for development 
(PS4D) or private sector engagement are often used. 
‘Private sector in development’ generally refers to private 
sector activities that are part of regular core business 
operations and that affect development outcomes and 
economic growth through positive impact such as job 
creation, provision of goods and services and taxation, and 
negative impact such as environmental degradation and 
poor labour practices (Di Bella et al. 2013). Governments 
and development organisations carry out activities aimed 
at developing a vibrant private sector (mostly in 
developing countries). These activities are grouped under 
the umbrella ‘private sector development’ (PSD).  
Mini-lexicon 
 
The private sector  
- consists of organisations that have 
a core strategy and mission to 
engage in profit-seeking activities 
through the production of goods, 
provisions of services and/or 
commercialization. 
Private sector in development 
- refers to private sector activities 
that are part of regular core 
business operations and that affect 
development outcomes, both 
positively and negatively. 
 
Private sector development 
- groups all activities carried out by 
governments and development 
organisations with the aim of 
developing a vibrant private sector 
(mostly in developing countries). 
 
Private sector for development  
- covers activities aimed at involving 
or engaging the private sector in 
development in ways that go 
beyond their regular business 
practices. This report places private 
sector engagement, private sector 
involvement and private sector 





One can differentiate between regular business activities, their positive and negative 
development impact and the PSD agenda promoting this on the one hand and business activities 
with an explicit development dimension on the other hand. This is coined ‘private sector for 
development’ (PS4D) or ‘private sector engagement’. PS4D covers initiatives or activities that 
involve or engage the private sector in development in ways that go beyond their regular 
business practices. It is about finding ways to mobilize businesses’ resources – e.g. their 
expertise, networks, data, and financial, technical and innovation capacity – in the pursuit of 
development goals (Byiers n.d.; Byiers and Rosengren 2012; Di Bella et al. 2013).  
 
The table below summarizes the different roles private sector can play in development 
cooperation. This typology was compiled in the explorative study preceding this one (Vaes and 
Huyse 2015). A first set of two roles points out that the private sector can be a resource provider 
in development activities, by contributing in a material (finance, in-kind) or non-material 
(expertise, network, data) way. Next, the typology identifies four ways in which the private 
sector can be a beneficiary in development activities. It can benefit from the donor efforts to 
improve the business climate, from capacity building, knowledge sharing, information provision 
or networking initiatives, from financial support by other development actors and from 
implementation contracts for specific development activities. Also, private sector can be the 
target of actors who want to influence business practices to become less harmful or more 
development oriented. Government can hope to influence through regulation whereas NGOs 
can use public campaigns or other lobby and advocacy tools. Private sector actors can engage in 
reforming or reinventing the way they do business. The typology distinguishes between 
reformers, who adapt their business practices to align it more with development goals (e.g. CSR, 
making product chain more inclusive), and developers/implementers who invent entirely new 
business models (e.g. social enterprises, hybrid business models) and/or implement them. 
Finally private sector can also be an active participant in different policy processes, such as 
consultation, policy dialogues, or multi-stakeholder initiatives. This can take place at different 
levels, from the local to the global. 
 
Table 2.1 Roles of private sector in development cooperation 
 Role of the private sector actor Examples (not exhaustive) 
1 Resource provider - finance 
Private sector invests financial resources. 
 Corporate philanthropy, e.g. Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation, Philips Foundation, local 
companies sponsoring start-up competition. 
 Businesses investing in/managing investment 
funds with development objective. 
 Impact investing 
2 Resource provider - expertise and other 
strategic resources 
Private sector invests its expertise, network, 
data, research capacity, etc. in activities with 
particular development relevance undertaken 
by or in partnership with other companies, 
government agencies, or NGOs. 
 Established SMEs coach start-up SMEs 
 Established entrepreneurs/managers share 
expertise with peers 
 Bottom of the pyramid product development 
 Frugal innovation technologies 




3 Beneficiary  -  enabling environment 
The private sector is the beneficiary of efforts 
to create an enabling business environment. 
 Improving the business climate to stimulate 
business and investment. 
 Removing red tape obstructing SME 
development.  
 Infrastructure development needed for take-off 
of growth sectors. 
4 Beneficiary  -  capacity development, 
information provision & knowledge 
sharing 
The private sector is the beneficiary of capacity 
development, information provision and/or 
knowledge sharing initiatives that aim to 
increase private capacity to contribute to 
developmental goals. 
 Capacity development of Business Development 
Services (e.g. chambers of commerce). 
 Building business capacity on development 
challenges and possibilities to address them.  
 Donor agencies/embassies investing in 
information provision on business opportunities 
in developing countries.  
5 Beneficiary -  financial support 
The private sector is the beneficiary of 
financial support that aims to catalyse private 
sector activity or investment with particular 
development impact. 
 Donor capitalization of Development Finance 
Institutions (DFIs).  
 DFIs supporting SMEs with activities in 
developing countries. 
 Challenge fund to support innovation or job 
creation. 
 Donors providing credit guarantees to catalyse 
high risk private investments with potential 
development benefits. 
6 Beneficiary – of contracts for 
implementing aid projects & programmes 
The private sector is involved in the execution 
of development activities, in the role of 
subcontractor. 
 Participation of consultancy groups & 
companies in development cooperation tenders 
(e.g. in social sectors such as education & health). 
 Tied aid 
7 Target – of regulation, lobby or advocacy 
The private sector is pushed by global 
governance institutions, governments or civil 
society organisations to change business 
practices. 
 Public campaign by international NGO 
condemning business practices of a multinational 
 Government using regulation to foster 
responsible fiscal business practices 
8 Reformer – adapting existing business 
models through Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Corporate Social 
Accountability or Stakeholder Value 
Maximization  
The private sector adapts its own business 
model to increase its positive development 
impact and sustainability. 
 
 Make product value chain more sustainable & 
inclusive. 
 Offering product transparency. 
 Invest in third party certification of social & 
environmental commitments. 
9 Developer/implementer – implementing 
new, social, inclusive or solidarity 
economy initiatives and business models 
The private sector develops and implements a 
new (inclusive, social, solidary) business 
model or initiative with particular development 
relevance. 
 Social entrepreneurs developing a profitable 
sustainable business model that prioritizes both 
social as well as economic added value. 
 Businesses aiming to include vulnerable groups 
in their supply chain. 
10 Participant – in policy dialogue & multi-
stakeholder initiatives on development-
related issues 
The private sector takes part in development 
related policy dialogue or multi-stakeholder 
 Participation in policy dialogue on post-2015 
Sustainable Development Goals framework 
 Join forces with other development actors (e.g. 
NGO) to lobby for policy reforms regarding 
social or ecological issues. 
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initiatives that aim to influence business and 
development policy and practice. 
 Participation in tripartite negotiations & multi-
stakeholder initiatives on decent work 
 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) 
 United Nations Global Compact 
Source (Vaes and Huyse 2015) 
2.2 A small donor perspective  
This study takes a small donor perspective. The historic trend as well as the latest ODA estimates 
(2013 and 2014) place Belgium amongst the small donors of the OECD-DAC member states. 
Specifically for South Africa Belgium is not a heavy weight either. With its gross disbursements 
of ODA to South Africa amounting to approximately USD 20 million in 2013, Belgium closes the 
top 8 of South Africa’s donors. However, the distance with Germany, the sixth biggest donor 
with a budget of US 80 million, France, the second biggest donor with a budget of over USD 350 
million and USA, the biggest donor with a budget of over USD 450 million puts the top 6 donors 
firmly in a different leak. This analysis is about all Belgian ODA combined, and is of course even 
more pronounced for Flanders as a separate donor. In view of the recent Belgian decision to 
withdraw from Belgian development cooperation from South Africa, taking this into account has 
become even more relevant.   
 
Being a small donor entails a constant search for focus and for a catalysing effect: the first as a 
way to minimize overhead costs (e.g. the costs for the identification, negotiation, start-up, and 
management of programmes) and the second as a way to have biggest impact with the limited 
resources available. The latter can translate in a preference to join forces by contributing to 
larger programmes ran by other donors (which makes it hard to stand out). It can also trigger an 
aptitude for innovative interventions that aim to cause a ripple effect for beyond the original 
scope by leveraging additional resources from other actors. And it can result in a bigger emphasis 
on policy coherence.  
 
This is the backdrop against which Flanders has to develop its position vis-à-vis private sector in 
development cooperation. It is taken into consideration in this study firstly through the choice 
of cases: the first two cases – the by Flanders supported Sustainable Enterprise Development 
Fund and the Danish Business-to-Business instrument – are small donor examples, the third 
cases explores the South African BBBEE policy as possible leverage. It is also taken into account 
throughout the analysis of the different cases and the formulation of final reflections. 
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2.3 Case study protocol  
The aim is to dissect the selected cases in order to identify interesting features and lessons 
learned. The case selection is the result of a participatory process: the selection was oriented by 
the outcomes of a workshop in which the results of the first research were presented and 
discussed with the Flanders Department of Foreign Affairs and Flanders Investment & Trade. 
Participants agreed one Flemish case should be included (e.g. the SEDF). Additionally there was 
interest in a case that would dig deeper into the policy guidelines that accompany a specific 
private sector instrument (e.g. the guidelines of the B2B programme). The screening and analysis 
of the cases is done in five steps.  
Firstly, the essential facts about the case are identified and presented in the case profile: who is 
doing what, with whom, where, how and why? This section should give a clear definition of the 
case at hand, and provide a clear overview of the main actors, activities, objectives and scale. A 
second step is about mapping the underlying logic that drives the case: what idea exists on how 
the planned or deployed activities will contribute to the defined objectives and the desired 
change? Or, put differently, what makes this case ‘tick’?  The third step is about identifying the 
different roles that private sector actors are engaged in. Fourthly, the information on the case 
is screened in order to put striking features into the spotlight by pinpoint three things: promising 
successes, interesting mistakes, and lurking traps. Looking for promising successes will help to 
uncover successful courses of action as well as the opportunities they created; interesting 
mistakes will reveal assumptions that have been proven wrong, unexpected problems and clever 
as well as failed solutions. Lurking traps will expose unproven assumptions and future 
challenges. Combined this should build better insights in the lessons a case has to offer. Finally 
the relevance of the case for the Flemish development cooperation in particular and small 
















3 |   Case 1: SME development through the Sustainable 
Enterprise Development Fund 
 
3.1 Who does what with whom, why, how and where? 
This case features the Sustainable Enterprise Development Facility, a development project 
financed by the Flemish development cooperation and implemented by the ILO in cooperation 
with local governments of Free State and Kwa-Zulu Natal provinces in South Africa. The case 
focuses on the first project period from 2011 to 2014, but also looks at the changed project set-
up in the second, ongoing project phase from 2014-2016. 
Figure 3.1 Case profile ‘SME development’ 
 
Source Interviews with Flemish Representation in Pretoria; Interviews with ILO officials; project documents. 
 
Key actors involved are: the Flemish development cooperation, donor of 4.5 million EUR in the 
first phase (2011-2014) and an additional 3.3 million EUR in the second project phase (2014-
2016); the International Labour Organisation as main implementing partner; the Free State 
Department of Economic, Small Business Development, Tourism and Environmental Affairs 
(DESTEA) and the Kwazulu-Natal Department of Economic Development, Tourism and 
Environmental Affairs (EDTEA) (as of 2015), both involved in the implementation of the project 
and to some extent in the design as well (especially in the second phase). 
 
A difficult start before 2011 led to the reclamation of part of the grant from the main 
implementing partner at that time, the Free State government. It also triggered the Flemish 
development cooperation to engage the ILO as main implementing partner, while at the same 
WHO?
Flemish development cooperation 
ILO
Provincial governments of Free State and 
Kwa-Zulu Natal
WHAT?
Systemic approach to enterprise 
development:
- entrepreneurship education
- SME & BDS challenge competition
- impact- and policy research
WHERE? WHEN?
Started in Free State province (Mangaung en 
Matjhabeng districts) in 2012 and ran until 
2014. Now renewed until 2016 and 
expanded to the entire Free State and Kwa-
Zulu Natal. 
WHY?
SME development could be an engine for 
job creation in South Africa, and decent jobs 




Facility for Job Creation
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time still insisting on close cooperation with the local government. Between 2011 and 2014 
project activities have been rolled out mostly according to plan. As of 2015 the project entered 
into its second phase where several changes to its original set-up have been introduced in part 
due to budgetary reasons and in part to take into account the lessons learned from the first 
phase. 
 
In the first phase the project covered several activity clusters1, with key activities being the 
development and introduction of modular entrepreneurship education flanked by a longitudinal 
impact study, support to policy research on SME development through the establishment of an 
SME observatory, and an SME challenge competition complemented with support for business 
development services. In the second phase, the focus lies on the business challenge. 
 
Key motivation for this project: Broad-based wealth creation through the promotion of decent 
work is a policy priority of South African government on national and provincial level. One way 
to pursue this policy goal is the creation of decent employment opportunities through Small and 
Medium-scale Enterprises (SME). The project seeks to strengthen the capacity of provincial 
government and its stakeholders in the private sector and civil society to make these policy 
priorities actionable, by implementing a range of initiatives in support of SME development (ILO 
n.d.).  
3.2 What makes this case tick? 
3.2.1 First phase (2011-2014) 
At the core of this project is its systemic approach. It distinguishes between four system levels 
of intervention (ILO n.d.:12): Meta-level interventions aim at changing mind-sets, value systems 
and perceptions held by different stakeholder groups (in this case within Free State Province). 
The macro-level is about the policies, laws and regulations shaping the overall enabling 
environment. Interventions at this level aim at facilitating a more conducive regulatory 
framework for doing business. The meso-level is about the institutional context, and 
interventions at this level aim i.a. at boosting the breadth and depth of local supply with business 
development services (BDS). At the micro-level the interaction between businesses, BDS 
providers and clients takes place. On each of these levels obstacles for SME development in 
South Africa have been identified.  
                                                          
1 According to the ILO project outline these are: the development of a mass-media based 
entrepreneurship promotion programme; the introduction of class-room based modular 
entrepreneurship education; the establishment of an SME observatory that informs policy planning and 
coordination; the facilitation of a SME policy dialogue mechanism at province level; the alignment of 
provincial level and municipal level SME policies; the introduction to market of industry-specific financial 
and non-financial BDS for SME; the establishment of a challenge fund targeting community based 
organizations; Social business plan/green business plan competitions for entrepreneurs; The 




As a result, the first phase project 
consisted of multiple complementary 
components, each addressing 
obstacles to SME development at a 
different level. At the meta-level, the 
lack of educational capacity to foster a 
culture of entrepreneurship and 
entrepreneurial aspirations amongst 
South African youth was addressed. In 
response, the startUP&Go 
entrepreneurship package was 
developed, based on experiential 
learning methodologies such as 
entrepreneurship games and business 
simulation exercises. It was 
implemented in the business studies 
course in 62 schools across the Free 
State province over a three-year 
period (Grade 10 in 2013, Grade 11 in 
2014 and Grade 12 in 2015). 
Simultaneously a quasi-experimental 
and longitudinal impact study2 was 
launched to assess both short-term 
impact on knowledge and entrepreneurial intentions and long-term impact on labour market 
outcomes such as employment creation and business start-up (by comparing 5600 learners that 
received the startUP&Go, with 10.000 learners that never received the module). Also 
intervening at this level were accompanying awareness raising and information provision 
activities, such as business days in schools. 
 
One obstacle situated at the macro-level was the unfavourable policy, legal and regulatory 
framework for the start-up and operations of SMEs. Due to a lack of consultation, coordination, 
and research, policy making was not informed and evidence-based enough and coherence 
between the different policy levels (national, provincial, municipal) was low. Apart from 
attempts to improve multi-stakeholder consultation, the project responded to this obstacle with 
the establishment of an SME Observatory at the Free State University. The Observatory 
conducted thirteen studies, amongst which a red-tape study and several sector-specific analyses 
of needs and possible policy responses regarding SME development in i.a. construction, 
agriculture, social enterprise, waste.  
                                                          
2 It will be the first time that the ILO follows such a large cohort of learners over such a long time. First 
research step was establishing baseline (grade 10 in 2013). Next, a first follow-up survey was done after 
10 months, end of 2010, in part to test and improve the study design. Next follow-up study will happen 
in October 2015. Have entrepreneurship intentions have increased? 10.000 learners (grade 11 in 2010) 
will be followed as a control group. 
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On the meso level, a study concluded that the current supply of BDS was a one-size fits all 
approach with a clear lack of capacity to provide tailored support for (beginning) entrepreneurs. 
The project launched a challenge fund: BDS providers in 5 different sectors could present a 
proposal, 25 were selected and received funding to implement their proposal. Monitoring and 
evaluation showed that the implementation was of very diverse quality. What can also be 
situated on the meso-level are the interactions with the different actors and institutions 
involved: although a less prominent features of the project, they contributed to the capacity 
building of teachers, of the Department of Education, of DESTEA, and other public actors 
involved in the project.  
 
A final component and the main eye catcher of the project was the enterprise job creation 
challenge: EnterPRIZE. Established businesses were approached to sponsor the competition by 
providing financial support (approx. 500.000 R was leveraged) or in-kind support (i.a. financial 
services, website development, or advertising). This allowed the fund to award a cash prize as 
well as mentorship and capacity building. SMEs could present their proposal for job creation, 
and a jury selected winners in different categories. The impact assessment of the first enterprise 
challenge concluded the competition resulted in 113 jobs created, among 43 winners and 
runners-up. Although directly intervening at the micro-level, its awareness raising and 
informative impact also makes it 
relevant on the meta and macro 
level.  
3.2.2 Second phase 
(2014-2016) 
 
The successes in the first phase 
and the resulting government 
interest and support, led to an 
expansion of the project to the 
entire province of Free State and 
Kwa-Zulu Natal. However, not all 
tracks to leverage additional 
finance worked out as expected. 
As a result, the expansion in fact 
increased budgetary constraints. 
Also, lessons learned from the 
previous project and a new 
responsible for the project 
implementation shifted 
priorities. Going into the second 
phase, some significant changes 





Firstly, in the StartUP&Go programme the focus will now be put on building sustainability. 
Beginning 2015 the continuation of StartUP&Go was still uncertain because the South African 
government had not confirmed its engagement to guarantee sustainability in the long term, 
which led to doubts about the added value of completing planned activities such as the teacher 
training to deliver the module. However, mid-2015 this changed, both at the national and the 
provincial level, leading ILO to start the development and implementation of a sustainability 
model for the Start UP&GO (see 3.4.1). 
 
Secondly, since the South African government did not buy into this component and did not want 
to ensure its long-term sustainability, the SME Observatory will not be continued in the second 
phase. It has been replaced by a different approach. Instead of maintaining a long-term relation 
with an academic partner, the focus now lies on the development of a database and 
standardized data collection on SMEs. The data collection will be continuous: it is integrated in 
all activities of the project (e.g. always registering SME participants and collecting information 
on their SME during activities) and government actors. It is considered as an important tool for 
informed decision making by government actors but also as a tool for monitoring and evaluation 
of the project activities. However, the project did not outline a clear framework for the analysis 
of the data. Instead, the idea was to perform targeted, ad hoc data analysis on contract base, 
but recent developments in the South African Department for Small Business Development may 
open the door towards a more systemic use (see below) 
 
Thirdly, the BDS component was judged too expensive and not successful enough. It is now being 
replaced by an e-learning system that will provide (emerging) entrepreneurs with practical 
information on the different steps a new entrepreneur has to go through. Developing and 
capacitating BDS providers directly is no longer part of project, although the project will 
communicate gaps in the BDS provision to the appropriate government actors in order to inform 
them about the demand for and the need for training of and BDS.  
 
Finally, the EnterPRIZE challenge remains the eye catcher of the project, but in a different form. 
Instead of an annual competition with a broad scope and different participant categories, it has 
been redesigned as a set of five mini-challenges each aimed at a specific sector (e.g. catering, 
design for assistive devices, youth innovation, green recycling, and responsible tourism). 
Selection of the sectors is being done on the basis of a market analysis and consultation with 
local government in order to reinforce their activities or support measures in specific sectors. 
The relation with the private sector has become more comprehensive and layered. The reason 
for doing sector-specific challenges is in part to allow for a more tailored approach, with support 
measures adapted to the needs, opportunities and actors in a specific sector. Each challenge this 
web of support services has to be constructed again: consultation with the local government 
and identifying how to reinforce and complement their ongoing initiatives, mobilizing private 
sector players to partake in to organization of the challenges as well as in the follow-up 
trajectory that guides the participating (upcoming) SMEs to the market, and rolling out a 




Each challenge is seen as a new opportunity to involve private sector players. For example, the 
Youth Innovation Challenge in Kwa-Zulu Natal brings together the Sustainable Enterprise 
Development Facility (SEDF), with the eThekwini Municipality and IBM. It links up with a 
‘Hackerton’ hosted by IBM, where participants will be capacitated to apply mobile Big Data and 
Analytics Technologies to develop mobile applications that will address the challenges faced by 
the city. The winning solutions will be incubated with support of IBM who provides access to 
their licenced software free of charge for 3 years, to further develop the product, build more 
market traction and gain sustainability. Following the Hackerton, the participants will be invited 
to take part in the EnterPRIZE Job Creation Challenge, aimed at helping emerging youth driven 
technology businesses by offering prizes in the form of financial and non-financial assistance to 
entrepreneurs who find it difficult to secure conventional commercial funding for start-up or 
expansion of their ventures. Training will be provided to guide the business plan design process. 
Another example are the challenges in the catering sector. The catering challenge was supported 
by the Durban University of Technology Hotel School, Small Enterprise Development Agency 
(SEDA) and private sector partners, Bidvest, Spar, Tsogo Sun and the Fusion Cooking School. The 
green recycling challenge will have PETCO, South Africa’s main plastic bottles recycler as a 
partner. Standard Bank got involved in several of the challenges to train participants on financial 
obligations (pay taxes), tools and services.   
3.3 Roles for private sector 
As the previous section clearly illustrates, one of the most striking features in this project, in 
both its phases, is the variety of roles the private sector is playing. Going back to the typology of 
roles as presented in the previous chapter, this case features private sector in all the roles. 
However, some are more pronounced than others, and some have been more developed in one 
phase compared to the other. 
 
 Role of the private sector actor In the SEDF 
1 Resource provider - finance 
 
In both project phases private sponsors have raised the prize 
money for the SME competition.  
2 Resource provider - expertise and other strategic 
resources 
 
In both project phases private sponsors have contributed in-
kind by providing different types of capacity building 
(mentorships, business training), services (web-design), access 
to products (use of licenced software), access to distribution 
network, etc. 
3 Beneficiary  -  enabling environment 
 
In the first phase, the project included efforts to improve the 
enabling environment through research-based policy support. 
This has not been maintained in the second phase. 
4 Beneficiary -  capacity development, information 
provision & knowledge sharing 
 
Emerging SMEs are the core target group of this project. 
Entrepreneurs/SMEs participating in the challenge 
competitions are direct beneficiary of capacity development 
and information provision. Less obvious but equally 
important: Established business will have improved access to 
information on emerging SMEs in their value/supply chain 
thanks to the database (under construction) on SMEs (a feature 
of the second phase). 
5 Beneficiary -  financial support 
 
Additionally, entrepreneurs/SMEs participating in the 
challenge competitions are direct beneficiary of financial 
support through the cash prize. 
6 Beneficiary – of contracts for implementing aid 
projects & programmes 
 
In the first phase, private consultants were engaged in the 
component on business development service providers. In the 
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second phase project, data analysis and research will be 
outsourced. 
7 Target – of regulation, lobby or advocacy 
 
The emerging private sector can be considered a target of the 
efforts to guide more businesses to the formal sector. 
8 Reformer – adapting existing business models 
through Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate 
Social Accountability or Stakeholder Value 
Maximization  
 
These seem to be a less developed roles in the project. In the 
first phase of the project, the main criterion for supporting 
SMEs was job creation, and attention payed to decent work, 
CSR, or environmental agendas was far less explicit, which 
suggest limited attention for a reformer role In the second 
phase of the project these roles might be more present because 
of the selection of specific sectors that fit with a more 
sustainable business model (e.g. recycling, sustainable tourism). 
The involvement of the established businesses is mostly about 
sponsoring and the project does not explicitly aim for changes 
in the business models of the established private sector 
partners. The project did not entail explicit stimulation of ‘new’ 
business models. 
9 Developer/implementer – implementing new, 
social, inclusive or solidarity economy initiatives and 
business models 
 
10 Participant – in policy dialogue & multi-stakeholder 
initiatives on development-related issues 
 
Private sector was present as a participant in the first phase of 
the project, where multi-stakeholder consultation and research 
involving private sector actors was still part of the project. So 
far this is less visible in the second phase. 
* The roles of ‘reformer’ and ‘developer’ have been discussed together because especially in a project aimed at 
facilitating and stimulating new entrepreneurs the distinction between both may seem artificial and confusing. 
3.4 Striking features 
3.4.1 Promising successes  
The StartUP & Go program woke quite some interest in the National Department of Education. 
In its review of the (primary and higher) educational system and of the different approaches to 
entrepreneurship education, the South African Human Resources Development Council judged 
the StartUP&Go very favourably, prompting the Ministry of Education to explore whether this 
approach could be brought to scale in business studies and other courses across South Africa. 
However, altering curricula is easier said than done. A good way to start such a scaling-up would 
be by ensuring the necessary follow-up for the ongoing program. At first the government did 
not make clear commitments in both regards (the sustained commitment to the further 
implementation of the programme in the Free State province nor the implementation 
nationwide). This left the ILO in uncertainty about the sustainability of this project component. 
However, recent events present a more promising outlook.  
The provincial government requested the ILO for continued support to work towards the 
sustainability of Start Up&Go in the Free State province. In response to its letter of request the 
ILO will now develop and implement a sustainability model for Start Up&Go in the province. This 
model involves completing the training of the grade 12 teachers and the training of six trainers 
who will in future ensure the training and support to Start Up&Go teachers. The Provincial 
Department of Basic Education will also take over the sustainable supply of the Start Up&Go 
materials and the implementation of impact assessment to verify and quantify the effect of the 
approach. At the national level, the Department of Basic Education and the Department of 
Higher Education completed a comprehensive national review of how well entrepreneurship is 
mainstreamed through the curriculum in order to transfer entrepreneurship competencies to 
young people for a more successful transition from school to the world of work. Their broad 
conclusion is that the education system is failing in this regard. In this context the departments 
have expressed their clear interest in making use of the startUP&Go in the subject Economic and 
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Management Sciences (grades 7-9) and in business studies, economics and accounting (grades 
10-12) nationally. Although still at an early stage, these intentions demonstrate a clear buy-in of 
the provincial and national government, boding well for the sustainability of the startUP&Go 
and showing how an initially small but innovative and well-monitored intervention can have an 
impact transcending its original scope.  
The success of the first phase led to a request from the South African government to expand the 
project to the entire Free State province as well as to Kwa-Zulu Natal. To support this expansion, 
the South African government matched the project funds with an extra 20 million Rand. The 
relation with and involvement of Free State government has improved and more high-level 
officials are becoming involved in public project activities. In Kwa-Zulu Natal, the provincial 
government is taking ownership from the start, clearly indicating where the project could 
complement ongoing initiatives and taking part in the implementation and organization of 
activities. However, a bureaucratic hitch may prevent the financial contribution of the South 
African government3. 
Key is that both success stories point out buy-in by the South African government. This resonates 
very well with the project’s strategic goal: to address the limited room the current policy and 
regulatory environment leaves for small business by deploying a model that shows how it can 
be done, and by triggering government buy-in. Without this underlying strategy the project risks 
to be successful but with a small and unsustainable impact. It would end up using a very limited 
budget to create and showcase pockets of excellence, but without reproduction. 
On a different plane, the project is succeeding in mobilizing a quite impressive set of established 
South African and international businesses that all contribute in one way or another: IBM, 
Nandos, PETCO, Microsoft, Netbank, Standard Bank, Spar, etc. This aspect is even stronger in 
the second phase, where the sector specific challenges allow for a targeted search for sponsors, 
and where sponsors often also have something to gain from their involvement (talent spotting, 
harvesting innovative ideas, broadening their client base, visibility and image building). 
3.4.2 Interesting mistakes 
The project experienced a false start when the original partner, the provincial government of 
the Free State (DESTEA) did not implement as planned. Instead of abandoning the project, 
Flanders negotiated a new partnership with ILO as implementer. However, DESTEA remained 
involved and it was Flanders’ clear intention to gradually increasing this involvement. This 
change of course was not an evident one: the South African governments at all levels insists on 
channelling development cooperation themselves and were not happy about the changing 
configuration, whereas the ILO saw the implementation of the project hindered by the 
obligation to keep local government in the loop. At different stages in the project this triangular 
relation was quite troublesome. However, on the long run this partnership model led to 
considerable capacity development for and buy-in of the government actors involved. This trend 
was already visible at the end of phase 1, when the provincial government decided to devote 
extra financial resources, detached 2 senior staff to the project and high level officials started 
                                                          
3 The money would have to be aid to ILO headquarters in Geneva before reverting to the ILO South 
Africa budget, which would cause significant unnecessary costs. 
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participating in the project events. Additionally, the provincial government of Free State 
increasingly involves or consults ILO in policy processes outside of the project as well, which 
shows how the relation of trust built through the project has a wider effect. 
  
The first phase of the project included an SME Observatory. Part of the Observatory’s work load 
was a study on entrepreneurship attitudes with the idea of doing a follow-up study after 5 years. 
It also conducted an impressive amount of sector specific studies and improved insight in the 
cost of the ‘red-tape’4 hindering SME development in Free State. However, going into the second 
phase, partners have lost interest in the SME Observatory. DESTEA did not buy into the SME 
Observatory, and will not provide finance for its continuation. Without an outlook on 
sustainability, the ILO considers it too expensive to continue. This has several implications. It 
means the problem of ill-informed decision making with very limited stakeholder consultation 
will no longer be directly addressed in the project. In the short term an important learning 
opportunity is lost, because the planned follow-up study on entrepreneurship attitudes will not 
take place. It would be important to understand why the Observatory did not succeed in 
reaching its target audience. The fact that the Free State University, still labelled as a ‘white’ 
university, was involved may have triggered some animosity. 
 
The first round of the EnterPRIZE challenge had a very broad scope. The upside of this approach 
was the big number of participants and the high visibility, which may have led to a broader 
impact regarding awareness raising and capacity building. The downside however was that the 
support package built around the competition, with the involvement of private sponsor, 
remained uniform and was not tailored to the specific needs of specific types of SMEs. This 
lesson learned has been duly taken into account in the second phase of the project, with a focus 
on sector specific challenges, each with their own set of sponsors, events and prizes. However, 
this also drives up the organization cost, leaving less room for the other project components.  
3.4.3 Lurking traps 
The budgetary constraints faced by the project in the second phase and the changed format of 
the enterprise challenge are changing the design of the project: from a multilevel project with 
balanced components it seems to become a project that centres on a succession of challenge 
competitions. This raises different questions. Firstly, how will the project address the systemic 
obstacles for SME development in the future, with much less attention going to the macro and 
meso level (policy and regulatory environment; and the BDS providers)? The current project 
design does offer some leads (introducing a database and standardized approach for data 
collection and taking the role as whistle blower on what BDS are under-developed) but assumes 
that this will be enough for the government to take over. This assumption has yet to be proven. 
However, in a recent development (July 2015), the South African Department of Small Business 
Development (DSBD) requested the ILO for the integration of the database (in the making) into 
a national SMME rating agency (to be established in the near future). The agency would use the 
                                                          
4 Red tape is an idiom that refers to excessive regulation or rigid conformity to formal rules that is 
considered redundant or bureaucratic and hinders or prevents action or decision-making. 
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database to feed its analysis of the overall condition of SMME and inform the government’s 
attempts to ensure the necessary access to finance. This shows - again- the potential of 
triggering government-driven upscaling of a project component. Yet, it remains unclear at this 
stage to what extent to database information will be used and how broad and encompassing 
any future analyses will be.  Secondly, will learning opportunities built during the first phase be 
taken advantage of? The first phase of the project laid the foundations for several interesting 
learning opportunities, for example on the impact of the StartUp&Go program and on the 
evolution in entrepreneurship attitudes and red tape in Free State. Cashing in on these learning 
journeys does not seem to be a clear component in the second phase project.  
 
The project may also face a risk of instrumentalisation by the local government as well as by the 
private sector. The first is becoming more and more involved in the project, but this involvement 
seems to focus on the challenge competition and the public events related to it. How to make 
sure that the involvement of local government transcends short-term political ambitions and 
also goes out to the structural changes needed to boost SME development? The private sector 
is being involved as a sponsor. No clear guidelines seem to be in use on what private sector to 
engage with and under which conditions. No clear pathway to guiding these businesses toward 
revisiting their own business models is set out. This means that the project partners run the risk 
of getting involved with a private player with a bad corporate track record, which would also 
harm their own legitimacy and image. It also means the relations with the established private 
sector are not set in a broader vision on how to make established business more inclusive and 
sustainable. The challenge competition that is gaining attention and creating opportunities to 
pull in private sector, is an innovative aspect of this project, but how to avoid that the business 
centred component in the project ‘eats’ all the other components? 
3.5 Relevance 
As this case is an ongoing project in the Flemish development cooperation with South Africa it 
is of direct relevance for the policy reflection on both the role of the private sector in 
development cooperation and the role of ODA in the cooperation with South Africa post-2016. 
It should be considered as an interesting learning opportunity on SME development in South 
Africa and on interacting with the private sector as development actor. In the same line, past 
and upcoming evaluations of this project and of other projects in the SME development portfolio 
could offer additional insights in the role Flanders envisions to play in emerging countries such 
as South Africa. The case also illustrates the challenges and added value of taking a strategic 






4 |  Case 2: Business-to-Business (B2B) Programme 
4.1 Who does what with whom, why, how and where? 
This case features Danida’s Business-to-Business (B2B) programme, which ran from 2006 to 
2011 and aimed to facilitate partnerships between Danish enterprises and local enterprises in 
19 eligible countries: Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, China, Egypt, Ghana, 
Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and 
Zambia. The case study investigates the B2B programme as a whole5, but pays special attention 
to the B2B activities in South Africa.  
Figure 4.1 Case profile ‘Business-to-Business partnerships’ 
 
Source (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark n.d.) 
 
 
Key actors involved in running the B2B programme were Danida's Business and Contracts and 
Department, responsible for policy, coordination and guidelines, and the assigned B2B 
coordinators at the Danish embassies in the eligible countries, who were in charge of the follow-
up of the implementation and the administration. The 19 eligible countries were Danida’s 
programme countries, including Egypt and South Africa. A distinction was made between focus 
and non-focus countries, with less staff capacity in the latter. South Africa, for example, was a 
                                                          
5 This is in part due to constraints in available information: most collected data referred to the B2B 
programme as a whole and data on the specific partnerships with South African counter parts was 
scarce. 
WHO?
Danish development cooperation (Danida)
Danida's Business and Contracts and 
Department 
Danish embassies in elible countries
WHAT?
Grant support for business to business 
partnerships, including i.a.:
- matchmaking grant to cover travel costs
- support for feasability study
- support for deepening partnerships
WHERE? WHEN?
From 2006 untill 2011, in 19 elible countries. 
Building on its predecessor, the Private 
Sector Development Programme and 
followed in 2011 by the Danida Business 
Partnership facility, now suspended.
WHY?
Long-term mutually committing 
partnerships will contribute to developing 







focus country, meaning the embassy was staffed with staff member dedicated to the B2B 
Programme. In non-focus countries the function of B2B coordinator was not a full time one. 
Overall the programme required a 
substantial management input, with over 18 
full-time equivalents engaged in the 
programme.  
 
Danish and local companies were the key 
target group. The entire B2B portfolio from 
2006-2011 contained over 445 partnerships 
with 420 Danish companies6. Although the 
portfolio covered partnerships in a wide 
range of sectors, some sectors dominated, 
such as agro-industries & food, information 
& communication technologies (ICT); and 
environmental technologies (DEVFIN 
Advisers AB 2014). Local embassies had the 
mandate to determine focal sectors as well 
as specify additional criteria and conditions 
they would apply in the selection of the 
candidates.  
 
The B2B programme was designed to 
provide grant support of up to 5 million DKK 
in three different phases of a partnership: 
First, in the ‘contact phase’ aimed at locating 
and selecting a suitable partner and 
investigating the possibilities for 
collaboration, both Danish companies and 
companies in the B2B eligible countries could 
apply for matchmaking grants covering 
travel costs (for up to 90%). An estimated 
1300 contact engagements took place. In the 
second ‘pilot phase’ partnering companies could apply for a grant to cover (75% - 90%) of the 
costs related to the start-up of the partnership. This might entail a feasibility study, training 
activities, study visits, or pilot production. About 445 collaborations were supported in the pilot 
phase. Approximately 240 of these partnerships and a few additional ones, moved up to the 
‘project phase’. In the project phase, the partners could apply for support to deepen the 
partnerships, often by setting up joint ventures. The grant could be used to cover costs related 
                                                          
6 This covers only the activities in the pilot in the project phase, and excludes the contact phase. The 
contact phase alone involved over 1300 interventions, of which not all led to the actual formalization of 
a partnership. 
Box 1: Danida’s B2B in South Africa 
South Africa was a focus country for the B2B 
programme, meaning the Danish embassy in 
Pretoria had a dedicated B2B coordinator to 
follow-up on all the B2B activities.  
 
As explained in the 2010 policy document 
‘Partnership for the Future’, the focus of B2B in 
South Africa was put on ‘sectors with a 
substantial development potential and local 
demand’: the climate and energy sector, and the 
agricultural and environmental sectors (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2010). The B2B 
portfolio for South Africa does indeed contain 
projects within these sectors, with some 
exceptions and with no striking predominance of 
one specific sector (see also annex 2). 
 
It was also specified that in South Africa, 
Danida’s commercial instruments would be used 
to work in particular on African youth and 
increasing decent job opportunities. 
Consequently, poverty alleviation and Broad 
Based Black Economic Empowerment 
(BBBEE) were considered key words when 
selecting future projects. Additionality was also 
forward as a condition for approval of funding 




to training and technical assistance, equipment, setting up or improving production facilities, 
further studies and so on. Special attention was payed to the improvement of the working 
environment and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the local companies. 
 
In essence the B2B programme was seen as a tool to support local private sector development 
through the establishment and development of long-term mutually committing, sustainable and 
commercially viable partnerships between Danish companies and companies in Danida’s priority 
countries, including Egypt and South Africa. In particular technology and knowledge transfer 
were considered key (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2014). The total approved financial 
allocation for B2B partnerships in pilot or project phase, for the 19 countries and over the entire 
period from 2006 to 2011 
amounted to 1,088 million DKK 
(Danida 2014). B2B was in mid-
2011 replaced by the Danida 
Business Partnership facility 
(DBP), which was however 
suspended in November 2014 
after an evaluation cast strong 
doubts on the effectiveness of 
the approach (Danida Business 
Partnerships 2014).  
4.2 What makes 
this case tick?  
4.2.1 Theory of change7 
At the core of the B2B approach 
was the idea that a long-term, 
mutually committing and 
commercially viable (and thus 
sustainable) partnership between 
a Danish company and a company 
in one of the priority countries 
would lead to a win-win.  
 
The local company would benefit from the expertise of the Danish company. Through 
technology transfer and transfer of know-how the partnership would strengthen the company’s 
                                                          
7 Theory of Change defines long-term goals and then maps the necessary preconditions and the types of 
interventions that bring about the outcomes aimed for. 
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place in the local, regional and even international market place, leading to an improvement of 
its competitiveness. Technical assistance and training is therefore considered as the cornerstone 
of the B2B programme (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2010).  
 
Through the partnership with the local company, the Danish counterpart, on the other hand, 
may gain market access, access to raw materials and access to cheaper production lines. Finally, 
the B2B programme would give the Danish development cooperation an instrument “to make 
use of Danish companies’ competences in development work more effective in promoting 
sustainable development”(Danida Business Partnerships 2014).  
 
In theory, the B2B programme would catalyse and facilitate this dynamic mostly through the 
provisions of grants to support the partnership in its different phases. Looking at the practice on 
the ground however, it becomes clear that the B2B support went far beyond the provision of 
grants. In practice, the local embassies invested deeply in match making8 (Siem Lynge 2011, 
Interview Danish Embassy Pretoria 2014), in the facilitation of the activities undertaken in the 
framework of the partnership (e.g. advice and support in bureaucratic procedures) or in 
negotiations and conflict resolution between partners.  
 
Ideally, the 3-step design of the B2B program would lead to a cascade of deepening partnerships: 
support in the first contact phase would allow companies to start a partnership, which would 
then, through support in the pilot phase, be developed further, finally leading to a request to 
support the project phase in which a joint venture was aspired. However, looking back, this 
effect did not materialize as hoped for. Of the more than 445 supported partnerships, about 205 
went only through a pilot phase. About 240 collaborations received project phase support (with 
or without earlier pilot).  
  
                                                          
8 For example through the organization of business trips, study visit, getting to know the partner 
workshops, pre-investment meetings for Danish companies. 
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4.2.2 Criteria & conditions 
 
Less clear is how the B2B programme 
intended to achieve its aspired impact 
on poverty. Looking at the specific 
requirements for companies to 
qualify for B2B support, some 
additional elements come to light.  
 
Specific requirements and criteria for 
the applications were spelled out in 
the guidelines for companies 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Denmark 2010). Firstly, both Danish 
and local companies had to comply 
with specific requirements to 
establish that they were ‘financially 
sound’. Secondly, the Danish company 
also had to show that it had the (staff 
and financial) capacity to invest in the 
partner, especially through technical 
training and assistance. A third set of 
conditions aimed to ensure ‘real’ 
partnerships, by excluding local 
companies with Danish ownership and 
by requesting proof of commercial 
sustainability and long-term business 
perspective. Of particular relevance in 
this study, are the fourth and fifth set 
of requirements related respectively 
to corporate ethics and the 
partnership activities.  
 
Under the banner of corporate ethics, 
the B2B criteria enforced two issues: 
respect for human rights and respect 
for workers’ rights. Additionally, the 
program encouraged applicants to join 
the UN global compact (see box 2).  
 
When assessing the partnership 
activities, additionality and 
development impact were stressed. 
Applicants had to defend and document (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2010): 
BOX 2: B2B requirements to 
corporate ethics 
 
“Companies involved in the B2B Programme 
must respect human rights. All partners must 
therefore identify and assess human rights issues 
relevant to their business operations, as set out in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR HR), and seek to integrate these rights 
into their business management. (…) This 
requires companies to be proactive in order to 
become aware of, prevent and address any 
adverse human rights impacts connected with 
their business activities.” 
 
“Additionally, companies must respect ILO’s 
fundamental standards on worker’s rights. (…) 
In countries that have not signed the UDHR HR 
or the ILO conventions and where national law 
is lacking, companies must enable alternative 
means for protecting human rights and rights 
regarding working conditions and terms of 
employment”. 
 
“The B2B Programme encourages companies to 
join UN’s Global Compact (…)”.  
 
BOX 3: B2B requirements to the 
partnership activities 
“If the proposed cooperation is deemed to have 
major negative consequences, if it lacks 
additionality, or if it does not contribute sufficiently 
to the country’s development, it will be rejected”  
 
“The more the application succeeds in documenting 
the developmental effects of the proposed 
cooperation, the more likely it is to be approved” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2010) 
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- the additionality of the activities envisioned in the framework of the partnership. The B2B 
Programme only supported partnerships with funding for activities that would otherwise 
not have been undertaken. 
- the positive impact on the competitiveness of the local partner, for example through the 
introduction of products, processes, technologies or skills, leading to increase in revenue.  
- the increase in employment opportunities (with a focus on youth and women) defined as 
the creation of ‘new decent jobs’ 
- the improvement of the external environment and the working environment. This referred 
to the positive impact of new technologies or improved production modes on efficient use 
of natural resources, waste treatment, occupational health and safety, and to the potential 
of using the partnership to raise awareness on these issues. 
- the promotion of corporate social responsibility. All partnership proposals were to be 
evaluated for the extent to which they contributed to awareness on HIV/AIDS, equal 
opportunities for men, women and youth, the promotion of worker’s and human rights, and 
sound business practices.  
 
In summary, the B2B programme did go beyond facilitating partnerships. Several provisions 
were put in place to orient the applications towards an explicit attention for corporate ethics, 
development impact and corporate social responsibility9. The B2B Programme also had a 
reporting process for the purpose of appraising proposals for partnerships and monitoring 
performance of the supported projects. This included application documents drafted by the 
companies and signed by the embassy, appraisals undertaken by the embassies, quarterly 
progress reports, project completion reports by the companies (Danida n.d.). 
 
It is important to note that the B2B support was delivered as reimbursement of expenses. This 
set-up would have allowed for a thorough assessment of the actual impacts of the activities 
undertaken in the framework of specific partnerships before effecting the actual reimbursement 
of the costs. However, the publically available information does not indicate such assessments 
were a common practice in the programme. Part of the usual process however was an audit by 
an accountant who reviewed the financial-technical aspects of the claimed expenses. Another 
note with regard to the transparency of the B2B programme: although the supported 
partnerships in South Africa are listed online, little to no information is available on what they 
pertained to. This complicates an assessment of their compliance with the theory of change and 
the criteria, conditions and requirements listed above. For example, a firm rule of B2B was that 
no production of alcoholic beverages would be supported, yet Royal UniBrew, the Danish 
leading beer brewing company was a beneficiary of the B2B program, and based on available 
information there is no way to determine whether this did or did not fit the intention behind 
B2B.  
4.3 Roles of the private sector 
In the general design of the B2B, the private sector is attributed several roles, which are listed 
and illustrated in the table below. Possibly specific partnerships may have had a different set of 
                                                          
9 These elements have been further strengthened in B2B’s successor, the Danish Business Partnership. 
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roles for the private sector. However, due to the limited transparency on the level of individual 
partnerships, it is difficult to gain insight in this. 
 
 Role of the private sector actor In the B2B 
1 Resource provider - finance 
 
This role is less prominent in the B2B programme: although 
the B2B programme reimbursed a very significant percentage 
of the costs (e.g. 90% contact phase, 75% - 90% in the pilot 
phase), the companies involved had to carry the remainder of 
the costs themselves. 
2 Resource provider - expertise and other strategic 
resources 
 
This was a key role in the B2B programme: the programme 
aimed at using the competences of Danish companies to build 
capacity of local companies (through transfer of knowhow and 
technology) and to support Danish development cooperation.  
3 Beneficiary  -  enabling environment 
 
Although B2B did hope to have a positive influence on the 
overall business environment in the focus countries, it did not 
have a real impact on this level. 
4 Beneficiary -  capacity development, information 
provision & knowledge sharing 
 
This was the most visible role for the local companies involved: 
they were considered as beneficiaries of the expertise, know-
how, technology of the Danish company. However, the 
Danish companies also benefitted in this regard, as they could 
lean on the services of the embassy to facilitate their search for 
a partner and their entry into a new market. 
5 Beneficiary -  financial support 
 
The Danish as well as the local companies involved in the 
partnerships were eligible for reimbursements of costs related 
to the partnership.  
6 Beneficiary – of contracts for implementing aid 
projects & programmes 
 
This was not a visible aspect of the B2B. 
7 Target – of regulation, lobby or advocacy 
 
The B2B programme had certain requirements pushing 
applicants, including the local companies in the priority 
countries, to comply with international regulation regarding 
human rights and labour rights even if those were not by law 
obligatory in the country of operation.  
8 Reformer – adapting existing business models 
through Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate 
Social Accountability or Stakeholder Value 
Maximization  
 
The B2B programme aimed explicitly at improving CSR in the 
participating companies. In that sense they attempted to draw 
the companies involved in a reformer role.  
 
 
9 Developer/implementer – implementing new, 
social, inclusive or solidarity economy initiatives and 
business models 
 
Although it might be possible that specific partnerships led to 
new business models, this was not a tenet in the programme. 
10 Participant – in policy dialogue & multi-stakeholder 
initiatives on development-related issues 
 
This was not a visible aspect of the B2B. 
 
Although different roles were touched on by the B2B program, the emphasis was clearly on 
companies being the beneficiary of financial support, with the aim of facilitating Danish 
companies to invest strategic resources in partnerships with local companies. This focus makes 
more sense when placing the B2B programme within Danida’s broader toolkit for private sector 
engagement. The B2B programme and its successor, the Danida Business Partnership (currently 
suspended) were part of a broader set of instruments the Danish development cooperation uses 
to interact with and engage business. Through the Danida Business Explorer, Danida provides 
financial support to Danish companies that want to investigate a specific business opportunity 
in a developing country, if it has a clear contribution to addressing development needs in the 
country. A second tool in the toolkit, is the Danida Business Finance, with provides subsidised 
loans to large infrastructure projects in developing countries. Thirdly, together with the 
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Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU), Danida established an SME facility to promote 
SME investments in developing countries. Fourthly, companies that are interested in 
implementation of the Danish development cooperation can explore the contract opportunities 
with Danida Business Contracts. Finally, promotion of development relevant export is supported 
through Danida Business Delegations. The Department for Green Growth is the entry-point for 
companies to Danish development assistance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2014). 
4.4 Striking features 
4.4.1 Promising successes 
One area in which the B2B programme clearly reached its goal was the transfer of technology 
and know-how at the micro-level, meaning from one company to another. The format of one-
on-one partnerships with intense interaction between the partners, subsidies encouraging a 
progressive build-up of the partnership and hands-on support from the Danish embassies in 
every stage of the partnership resulted in well-functioning partnerships that improved company 
management, productivity, turnover, and in many cases also improved the environmental 
management and working environment in the local companies. The large scale evaluation 
performed in 2014 confirmed that the B2B programme was relevant for enabling technology 
transfer and efficient in matchmaking and stimulating Danish companies to seek partnerships. 
It also had a clear impact in strengthening local companies as well as inducing learning for Danish 
SME. A part of this success was attributed to the rather liberal subsidies handed out, as well as 
to the active promotion of the B2B programme by the embassies and the Confederation of 
Danish Industries and the Danish Federation or Small and medium Sized Enterprises (DEVFIN 
Advisers AB 2014).  
 
A second promising aspect could be derived from the observation that “the B2B projects 
performed equally well in constrained as in conducive business environments” (Danida 2014:6).  
This is important because it suggests that the approach of the B2B programme also works in a 
more challenging environment (e.g. fragile states), and could therefore be used to support 
collaborations in countries were market forces are not already creating substantial FDI flows. 
The evaluation recommended that, in order to play out this strength, the B2B should be 
redesigned to promote cooperations in countries where they would really make a difference, 
and by emphasising the employment generation and development effects more.  





4.4.2 Interesting mistakes 
The logic underlying the B2B programme (see 5.2.1) clearly focuses on fostering the dynamic 
between the two partnering companies (and thus targets the micro level of individual companies 
and entrepreneurs). Yet, the overall and immediate objectives of the programme are far more 
systemic (and situated in fact on the meso and macro level): poverty reduction and 
strengthening local business development. However, the design of the programme did nog give 
any clear indication on how to bridge the gap between these two. This weakness has taken its 
toll: the 2014 evaluation concluded that the programme’s contribution to national business 
enabling environment, employment generation (in the local companies as well as upstream and 
downstream employment), socio-economic benefits for the local communities and the poverty 
reduction were negligible.  
 
The lesson learnt is dual. Firstly, it points out the importance of a well-developed theory of 
change in which clear links exist between the programme’s overall objective, immediate 
objectives, target group and deployed activities. Lack of coherence between those elements 
may jeopardize the success of the programme. It also shows that the B2B programme would 
have benefitted from a less narrow focus on the added value for the partnering companies. The 
potential for effective development impact would have been greater by demanding a clear 
apprehension of the external context of each of the partnerships, as well as by emphasising 
external CSR10 interventions in the business cases. In practice CSR was dealt with quite 
                                                          
10 A distinction can be made between ‘internal’ CSR, focuses on improving working conditions for 
employees (which in most countries is to some extent a legal obligation) versus ‘external’ CSR which 
focuses more on the external environment (e.g. protection of national resources) and may in some 
cases address a strategic element of the business concept. 
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differently throughout the programme, in part due to the fact that it was at the embassies’ 
discretion to shape and operationalise the guidelines.  
 
Danish embassies have played a very prominent role in the operationalisation and 
implementation of the B2B programme. In that sense, the programme was far more resource-
intensive than the combined budget of the allocated grants would suggest. Embassies were 
involved in the organisation of business trips for companies looking for a partner, in facilitating 
the first contacts, in the organisation of technical assistance, in negotiating between partners in 
good times and bad times, etc. Combined with the liberal grants (up to 90% of the costs the 
companies made could be reimbursed) and the overall lack of sustainability in the initiated 
partnerships, this was one of the reasons to question the overall efficiency of the approach. At 
the same time, however, this additional counselling and support on the ground was deemed 
necessary to make the partnerships possible and have some ‘return on investment’ from the 
grants. This shows the important link between the design of a programme and the institutional 
capacity necessary to make it work, which in this case was considered ‘disproportionate’. The 
South African B2B also faced an additional challenge: the Danish development cooperation with 
South Africa is being reoriented and phased out since 2007. The B2B programme was 
implemented in a context of declining development expertise at the embassy. 
 
A feature that could be seen as a promising success as well as an interesting mistake is the 
development of a set of requirements, criteria and conditions to assess the eligibility of 
applicants and appraise applications (see 5.2.2). In fact, few donors have detailed the conditions 
under which they aim to support private companies to play a role in development cooperation11. 
In this regard, the B2B guidelines offer an interesting example. However, the fact that the 2014 
evaluation still indicates the inadequate contribution to development objectives at the same 
time suggests that this set of requirements, criteria and conditions, or the way it has been 
implemented, was insufficient. In view of the limited information it is hard to formulate strong 
conclusion, but it could be that the step from theory (the guidelines for companies) to practice 
(operationalizing and enforcing them) was not enough considered.  
4.4.3 Lurking traps 
 
The B2B programme ran until 2011 after which it has been replaced by an adapted version called 
the Danish Business Partnership (DBP)12. However, in 2014 Danida suspended the DBP. Ongoing 
partnerships still continue as planned but no new commitments will be given. According to 
official communication this was due to the “evaluation of a former business-to-business 
                                                          
11 Sweden and Germany have also developed a more detailed framework for their interaction with the 
private sector in development cooperation. For example, the German develoPPP demand of all 
applicants that the “projects must demonstrate a clear development outcome and be both 
environmentally and socially compatible. A partnership with companies from sensitive business 
segments (such as arms or drugs) is ruled out.”  




programme, which concluded that the effect on job creation and sustainable growth in 
developing countries has not been sufficient. Furthermore, there has been unclarity with regard 
to EU rules” (Danida Business Partnerships 2014). The evaluation of the B2B Programme pointed 
out, amongst other things, that the programme had not been administered according to the EU 
de minimis regulations. This was also the case for the Danida Business Partnerships programme, 
the successor to the B2B Programme. Based on a legal opinion, which showed that parts of the 
financial support under the two programmes could possibly be regarded as state aid, it was 
decided to suspend the Danida Business Partnerships programme (Personal communication 
Danida, September 2015). A suspended program may not have to worry about lurking traps, but 
it may offer lessons that might be helpful for similar programmes, for which the reference to 
non-compliance with the EU-rules on state aid should raise a red flag.13 
 
Another lurking trap for similar approaches is revealed by looking again at the distribution of the 
B2B partnerships (see figure 5.2). It can be considered a promising success that the B2B 
approach allows partnerships in difficult as well as conducive environments to perform equally 
well. The other side of the coin is B2B’s failure to facilitate as many partnerships in difficult as 
well as in conducive environment. The distribution of Danish companies’ engagement among 
the 19 eligible B2B countries varied from no collaborations in Mali and Benin to over 60 in 
Vietnam14.  Or, to put it simply, B2B mostly supported partnerships in countries were the 
challenges are lowest and succeeded far less in convincing Danish business to look for 
partnerships in countries where they could add most value. Of course, this is not a novel 
challenge, as many private sector instruments struggle to push private resources towards low 
income countries or fragile states where the risks our highest.  
4.5 Relevance 
The case of Denmark’s B2B programme is particularly relevant because with this programme 
(and the bigger private sector toolkit it is part of) Danida was a frontrunner in engaging private 
sector in development cooperation. The recent evaluation makes Denmark one of the first 
donors with a large scale and in-depth evaluation of one of its private sector instruments. The 
fact that the evaluation has led to the suspension of two active private sector instruments 
suggests this case may present an important learning opportunity for all similar programmes. 
From the Flemish point of view, the resemblance between the different activities of the B2B 
programme and the services offered by Flanders Investment and Trade (contribution in the costs 
                                                          
13 During data collection little additional information on the inconsistency with EU state rules was found. 
Article 108(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) requires state aid to be 
notified to the European Commission so that it can assess whether the aid is compatible with the 
common market. However, under Regulation (EC) No 994/98 certain categories of aid can be exempted 
from the notification requirement. This ‘de minimis rule’ was introduced in order to exempt small aid 
amounts. It sets a ceiling below which aid is exempt from the notification requirement laid down in 
Article 108(3) TFEU. See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:l26121 
14 In China and Indonesia the B2B programme was only open for environmental projects. 
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for business trips or prospection, assistance in match making, grants for feasibility studies) 






5 |  Case 3: Corporate Social Investment (CSI) 
 
5.1 Who does what with whom, why, how and where?  
Core element in this third case is corporate social investment (CSI) in the context of the South 
African Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment policy (BBBEE). Unlike the previous two, 
this case does not dig into a specific project or instrument. Instead it looks at a private resource 
stream and explores some of the opportunities and risks for development actors who aspire to 
tap into this resource stream.    




Key actors are the South African government that has put in place the BBBEE policy and 
government institutions involved in the implementation of the policy; the companies operating 
in South Africa that generate CSI and that are bound by the BBBEE policy if they want to do 
business with South African government; and the various intermediaries involved in the 
management and monitoring and evaluation of CSI funds and strategies, as well as of the BBEE 
accreditation of companies. Also key, but less zoomed in on in this case study, are the actors on 
the receiving end of the CSI resource stream, which in many cases are non-profit organisations 
(NPOs) with a social objective. 
This case has two key elements – CSI and BBBEE – and looks at the synergy between both. 
Corporate social investment (CSI) can be understood as one expression or one sub-component 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR). It refers to a company’s contributions (in-kind as well as 
WHO?
- Companies operating in South Africa
- Business service providers specialised in CSI
- South African government promoting CSI 
through its BBBEE policy
WHAT?
In the broad sense CSI can cover cash and 
non-cash contributions as well as 
expenditure on social causes.
WHERE? WHEN?
CSI is not new, but the launch of the BBBEE 
Codes of Good Practice (2007) that also 
include a component  'socio-economic 
development' triggered a more strategic 
approach to CSI in South Africa. 
WHY?
CSI's potential benefits for the companies 
include an enhanced corporate image, 
improved employee morale, an enhanced 
socio-economic environment and good 
corporate citizenship. Through CSI a 
company can score points to become BBBEE 
compliant and gain access to public tenders.
Corporate Social 
Investment in South Africa
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financial) to activities that are external to the normal business activities of a company and not 
directly aimed at increasing company profit. Instead these activities have a strong 
developmental approach and utilise company resources to benefit and uplift communities.  
 
CSI has a particular status in South Africa because of the link with the Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) policy. The BBBEE policy aims to distribute wealth across a 
broad a spectrum of previously disadvantaged South African society. Or put differently, the 
purpose of BBBEE is to address the legacy of racist apartheid policies and enhance the economic 
participation of Black people in the South African economy. It attempts to do so by introducing 
Codes of Good Practices in combination with a Scorecard that measures a company’s efforts in 
living up to those Good Practices. Currently, companies can use CSI to score points on their 
BBBEE Scorecard.  
5.2 What makes this case tick? 
This case looks specifically at the synergy between the corporate social investment (CSI) on the 
one hand and the socio-development component of the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment policy on the other hand. BBBEE is considered as a driving force behind the 
mainstreaming of CSI in South African business 
practice. It is also considered as the trigger for the 
shift in CSI away from pure charity toward a more 
strategic approach to development. Underlying 
both instruments is the idea that, in view of the 
extreme inequality and social challenges in South 
Africa, companies cannot merely concentrate on 
making a profit, but have to acknowledge and 
embrace their responsibility towards social 
development.  
 
Following its Broad-based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act of 2004, the South African 
government launched BEE Codes of Good Practice15 
and an associated BEE Scorecard in February 2007. 
Although this policy framework does not explicitly 
impose legal obligations on firms to comply with 
BBBEE targets, a firm’s BBBEE status is a 
determinant factor when it comes to its access to 
public tenders and (in certain sectors like mining 
and gaming) to licences. For companies who wish to 
do business with government, BBBEE compliance is 
                                                          
15 These are the codes that companies can use in order to evaluate and track their B-BBEE efforts. 
Specific targets need to be met. The codes help businesses get an accurate rating which they can include 
in their company profile. 
Box 4: Five BBBEE 
components 
  
The following five elements are 
taken into account when calculating 
a firm’s BBBEE rating (the weight 
of each elements is indicated 
through the maximum amount of 
points a company can earn with this 
component):  
1. Ownership control – 25 
points 
2. Management control – 5 
points 
3. Skill development – 20 points 
4. New enterprise and supplier 
development – 40 points 
5. Socio-economic  
development (SED) - 5 points 




now mandatory. In addition, a number of industry charters bind other companies to align 
themselves with the Codes (Werksmans Attorneys 2014; Trialogue 2014).  
 
At the start seven elements were taken into account when calculating a firm’s BBBEE rating: 
ownership, management control, employment equity, skills development, preferential 
procurement, enterprise development and socio-economic development. A reform in 2014 has 
reduced this to 5 main components (Werksmans Attorneys 2014). These elements reflect the 
government’s efforts to increasing the number of previously disadvantaged communities in the 
management, ownership and control of businesses; 
to boost human resource and skills development, to 
work towards a more representative workforce (in 
all categories and at all levels); to promote 
preferential procurement in favour of goods and 
services with a strong B-BBEE score; and to 
encourage investment in enterprises that are 
owned or managed by previously disadvantaged 
groups.  
 
One of these components is Socio-Economic 
Development (SED). The inclusion of socio-
economic development as one of the 
transformation criteria on the Scorecard illustrates 
the government’s view that the private sector has a 
valuable contribution to make to community 
development. SED has been defined as “a monetary 
or non-monetary contribution made to black 
beneficiaries with the specific aim of facilitating 
sustainable access to the economy”(BEE Institute 
n.d.). In order to gain the maximum points for this 
component on the BBEEE scorecard (5 out of 118), 
a company would have to spend 1 percent of net 
profit after tax (or, alternatively, 0.125 percent of 
total turnover) on Socio-Economic Development 
(SED). The above stated definition clearly shows the substantial overlap with CSI, although it is 
not synonymous with SED.  
 
The difference between SED and CSI is that its specific aim is to create sustainable access to 
economy. It should therefore be seen not as pure philanthropy but as an economically based 
activity that has a social outcome, being job creation and sustainable access to economy. CSI is 
often more an investment in community health and less economically driven as SED. 
Consequently, investment in SED will be part of a company’s CSI but not all CSI will score SED 
points.  
 
Box 6: What can count as 
SED? 
 Monetary contributions 
(grants) or in-kind 
contributions to which one 
can attach a value such as 
stock, services, time of 
employees, etc. 
 If 75% of these contributions 
go to historically 
disadvantaged South African. 
Beneficiaries can be 
individuals or organisations 
whose beneficiaries are for at 
least 75% from previously 
disadvantaged groups.  
 For the purpose of funding 
activities that improve their 
sustainable access to the 
economy.  
 
(BEE Institute n.d.) 
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However, even when it doesn’t deliver BBBEE points, CSI can still be very relevant for a company, 
because it can lead to an enhanced corporate image, improved employee morale, an enhanced 
socio-economic environment and good corporate citizenship. Overall there are quite some 
incentives for companies to deliver on CSI. Trialogue, South Africa’s main CSI tracker gave the 
following state of play in its 2014 CSI report: The total estimated CSI expenditure in South Africa 
in 2013/14 was R8.2 billion. This represents a 4% nominal growth from 2013 but a decline of 2% 
taking inflation into consideration. Just 31 companies accounted for half of the total CSI 
expenditure. Moral imperative was the greatest driver of social investment (85% of 
respondents) (Trialogue 2014:36).  
5.3 Roles of the private sector 
Identifying the different roles that the private actors can play in CSI (within and outside BBBEE) 
helps to distinguish the different faces of CSI in South Africa. A good starting point is to see 
BBBEE as well as CSI investments as a business on its own, and not just as an aspect of doing 
business in South Africa.  
 
 Role of the private sector actor In BBBEE’s CSI 
1 Resource provider - finance 
 
Through their CSI private companies devote part of their 
profits to social goals through monetary contributions. This 
can include grants, discounts. 
2 Resource provider - expertise and other strategic 
resources 
 
Companies can do CSI not just through monetary 
contributions but also through contributions in kind. This can 
include donation of products, time of employees, transfer of 
know-how, etc. In fact any kind of contribution to which one 
can attach a monetary value can be taken into account. 
3 Beneficiary  -  enabling environment 
 
No information 
4 Beneficiary -  capacity development, information 
provision & knowledge sharing 
 
No information 
5 Beneficiary -  financial support 
 
Specific types of companies (those owned and managed by 
members of a previously disadvantaged community) are 
beneficiary of BBBEE, although this is mostly through the 
component on business and supplier development and less so 
through CSI. However, quite some projects aimed at SMME-
development for example do tap into CSI funds. 
6 Beneficiary – of contracts for implementing aid 
projects & programmes 
 
There is a wide range of consultancies and rating agencies that 
has made the development of a BBBEE strategy and the 
monitoring and verification of BBBEE ratings its core 
business. Additionally, banks have developed products 
targeting this resource stream, such as specialised funds for 
companies that want to outsource the management of their 
CSI (e.g. Tshikululu fund). 
7 Target – of regulation, lobby or advocacy 
 
BBBEE Codes and Scorecard are a clear example of a 
government policy that attempts to shape business practices 
through regulation. In this case the role of public procurement, 
which is only open to businesses that are BBBEE compliant, 
is key. 
8 Reformer – adapting existing business models 
through Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate 
Social Accountability or Stakeholder Value 
Maximization  
 
The underlying idea is mostly to push companies toward 
adapting their business practices by incorporating corporate 
giving. In that sense, the core aim of CSI is stimulating 
corporate philanthropy, a very limited interpretation of CSR. 
However, the most recent reform of the BBBEE Codes, in 
which additional emphasis is being put on, for example, 
inclusive value chain development also shows that the 
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conceptualisation of CSI is touching more and more on the 
core business of companies.  
9 Developer/implementer – implementing new, 
social, inclusive or solidarity economy initiatives and 
business models 
 
The consulted information did not contain clear indication of 
an agenda aimed at stimulating new innovative business 
models. 
10 Participant – in policy dialogue & multi-stakeholder 
initiatives on development-related issues 
 
No information 
5.4 Striking features 
Analysing and assessing the dynamics of BBBEE, CSI and SED comprehensively and identifying all 
lessons learned is beyond the scope of this study, however some interesting features can be 
pointed out. 
5.4.1 Promising successes 
What can be considered as a success is the expanding nature of CSI, partially driven by the BBBEE 
policy. While companies have been involved in CSI for over a decade, the requirements of the 
BBBEE Codes and Scorecard have accelerated the process and are triggering a more professional 
and strategic response to privately financed community development. This is leading to the 
introduction and promotion of the concept ‘strategic CSI’. Core element of the ‘strategic CSI’ 
approach is to align CSI activities more closely to the business model and core business. CSI is 
not only expanding content wise by going beyond charity, it is also becoming a more established 
element of South African way of doing business. Increasingly not just government actors but 
also private sector clients require their suppliers to be BBBEE compliant.  
 
Another interesting aspect of CSI is its potential to support the South African civil society. 
According to Trialogue, corporate respondents showed a clear preference for directing CSI 
funding through non-profit organisations (NPOs)16. In fact, all corporate respondents in 
Trialogue’s survey channelled part of their CSI funding through NPOs during the year. Vice versa 
CSI funding accounted for the greatest proportion of respondent NPOs’ income (22%) (see also 
figure 5.2). Government institutions were on the second place as recipients. 
  
                                                          
16 In the South African context the term NPO should be understood as stated in the following definition 
of the South African Department on Social Development: “An NPO is defined, in terms of section 1 of 
the NPO Act, as a trust, company or other association of persons established for a public purpose and of 
which its income and property are not distributable to its members or office bearers except as 
reasonable compensation for services rendered. Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and 
community based organisations (CBOs) are collectively known as non-profit organisations (NPOs). In 




Figure 5.2 NPOs are the most popular funding channel for CSI 
 
Source (Trialogue 2014) 
 
In the light of these trends, CSI is often considered when discussing possible alternatives for ODA 
provided by external donors. Both CSOs and government initiatives currently already tap into 
this resource stream (see figure 5.2). However this does not mean that CSI is stable source of 
finance for all types of civil society organisations. In fact, the distribution of CSI according to 
sector suggests that the CSOs benefiting from CSI are mostly social services providing CSOs, and 
less so CSOs involved in, for example, strengthening the accountability of government 
institutions. Also, as Trialogue’s annual survey shows, the amount of CSI might be stagnating. 
Amounting to a total of 8.5 billion R (roughly 700 million USD) in 2014, it still corresponds to less 
than half of incoming ODA in South Africa (in 2013) (OECD-DAC).  
Figure 5.3 Distribution of CSI by development sector  
 
Source (Trialogue 2014) 
5.4.2 Interesting mistakes 
There seems to be quite some consensus that CSI in general has been far too philanthropic and 
too much directed at simple charity causes, thus lacking ambition to have a sustainable and 
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systemic impact. Interviewees describe CSI as “a joke”, “window dressing”, “pure boring 
philanthropy”, “ticking the box” and “a corporate conscious appeaser”. There clearly are 
companies that have a different take, but there are also business representatives who still 
proudly present their project of donating blankets to the local hospital. Although, as has been 
mentioned above, a more strategic approach to CSI is emerging, this superficial approach clearly 
remains an issue in CSI today. In the words of one interviewee, the challenge seems to be: how 
to make CSI about the health system, instead of about clinics, about the education system, 
instead of about school, etc.   
 
This issue is particularly relevant in the light of the big involvement of the biggest companies. In 
2014, 31 of South Africa’s biggest companies accounted for half of the 2014 CSI stream 
(Trialogue 2014). It seems logical that the strongest shoulders bear the biggest weight, but the 
question is being raised whether CSI is the best tool to do so. In fact, big companies could have 
a much bigger impact if they would revise their business model and value and supply chain to 
make them more inclusive. One example often raised is that of the big chains, such as Shoprite, 
Checkers or Pick-and-Pay, who have a very firm grip on the retail in South Africa. They also do 
efforts in the areas of sustainability and community development. While there CSI programmes, 
for example in the case of Shoprite focused on women empowerment, skills development and 
hunger relief, might be laudable, working on the labour conditions in their value chains and 
including small-scale producers in their supply chain would have far bigger impact. This shows 
why CSI is still considered an “add on” in most cases.  In line with this, several interviewees also 
critique the risk aversive attitude of CSI. Although some attempts are being made, CSI is not 
easily directed at the development, experimenting, and piloting of innovative approaches to 
address certain development challenges. 
5.4.3 Lurking traps 
Without an in-depth assessment it is hard to pin-point the most dangerous traps ahead. 
However, from the different interviews and discussion several warnings could be distilled. 
Firstly, the ‘buzz’ around CSI seems unmerited in the light of the current scale and the 
uncoordinated and often superficial use of these resources. It therefore seems important for 
development actors to remain informed about the actual size and distribution of the CSI budgets 
in order to assess to what extent CSI is or could be directed toward sustainable development. 
This weakness also opens possibilities for development actors, as they could maintain a critical 
attitude toward CSI and could try to play a role in accelerating the reorientation of CSI.  
 
Secondly, the government push for BBBEE compliance has resulted in the emergence of a range 
of business service providers involved in strategizing, managing, monitoring and verifying BBBEE 
efforts, including those related to SED. At the same time, impact investors and funds and 
agencies involved in harnessing impact investment are also active in this domain. Although the 
contribution to development may have a place in their vision, business model and practices, 
they often do not work within nor have clear expertise on the framework in which bilateral 
donor agencies operate. Issues such as additionality, development impact, transparency, and 
accountability are often not understood in the same way as they are being defined in 
development policy and development cooperation instruments, and they are not guaranteed. 
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Still, these actors are important intermediaries and may prove to be instrumental in redirected 
CSI. 
5.5 Relevance 
This case is not about a ready-to-use tool, but about an evolving resource stream in the South 
African corporate/developmental landscape. It is relevant for a number of reasons. Firstly, as an 
interesting example of how the synergy between government policy and a corporate tool is 
slowly instilling a broader corporate social responsibility in South African business practices. 
Depending on how the shift towards more strategic CSI will progress, this could become a driver 
of bigger and more diverse involvement of private sector in development.  
 
Secondly, it is relevant because the BBBEE policy does not only affect South African companies. 
Any company that wants to do business in South Africa with government departments, public 
entities or enterprises, or with companies who supply goods and services to them, will be asked 
to provide its B-BBEE status17. As the distribution of the points across the different domains may 
have showed, most points can be earned on components that are less feasible for foreign 
companies (such as including previously disadvantaged groups in the management, ownership 
and control of the company). This also means that the remaining components, such as skills 
development, small-business development and socio-economic development (SED), become 
more important. However, even more than local companies, foreign companies may lack insight 
in the BBBEE requirements and the South African development challenges, as well as the 
connections and expertise to develop and implement a strategic approach to efforts in these 
domains. In that case they can call upon one of the consultancies to outsource this. This raises 
the question whether there is no way for bilateral donors active in South Africa to harness these 
efforts of their companies in order to direct them towards a systemic approach that can 
contribute to development in a sustainable and inclusive sense (Uk Institute of Export 2015).  
This question is relevant for Flanders as well. With the Flanders Investment & Trade (FIT) 
representation in Johannesburg Flemish companies have a clear anchor point for exploring 
business opportunities in South Africa, but what FIT can’t offer them is expertise on how to score 
BBBEE points in a responsible way. There may be a potential for more synergy, with Flemish 
companies supporting Flemish development cooperation and benefitting from Flemish 
development expertise.  
   
                                                          
17 If the annual revenue is likely to exceed R5 million 
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6 |  Three things a (small) donor can learn  
The case studies have given us a snapshot of a specific project, instrument or resource stream 
that is experimenting with the role of the private sector in development. They are both too 
diverse and too momentarily to distil general recommendations on how to shape and 
operationalize the future interaction between a small donor’s development cooperation and the 
private sector. One specific lesson learned on SME development, B2B partnerships and CSI have 
been discussed in the case study sections. However, they do also offer some interesting take-




Being the spark that lights the fire? It is no easy task to address systemic obstacles with small budgets. The 
case on SME development through the Sustainable Enterprise Development Facility shows that even if the 
budgets are too small to change the entire system, they can be big enough to showcase how it can be done. 
With targeted interventions at different levels, the SEDF project is having a ripple effect on entrepreneurship 
education, facilities for SME start-up and policy makers’ interest in SME development. This effect has been 
reached by devoting a limited budget to concept development, piloting and the creation of pockets of 
excellence. Looking ahead, further buy-in from stakeholders to copy, continue and scale-up will make or break 
success. In that sense, although difficult at times, efforts to engage local government have proven an 
important success factor.  
As one interviewee said: “It is the role of ODA to be the spark that lights the fire”. This lesson has a truth in 
many different settings, but seems especially apt in the context of the growing emphasis on the potential of 
mobilizing private resources for development. The idea of leveraging private resources (the fire) through 
targeted ODA supported interventions (the spark) is a central argument in the case for spending public funds 
in ways that benefit private actors. However, this may also mean that if it takes more than a spark to light this 
fire, something is wrong with the assumption that the private sector houses resources that can be leveraged 
for the purpose of sustainable development. In interactions with private sector aimed at being a catalyst for 
mobilizing private resources, it will be important to trace the actual leveraging effect, both for accountability 
and learning purposes.  
  
2. 
Bad time for short-term thinking? All three cases offer lessons learned through the mistakes that have been 
made, the smart solutions that have been employed and the experiments that have become success stories. 
The big BUT is that it took time, research and reflection to discern these lessons. Changing youth aspirations 
regarding entrepreneurship, changing entrepreneurs’ attitudes regarding corporate social responsibility, and 
changing the environment in which both have to operate is no small matter. However, the case on SME 
development also shows how short project durations and project reorientations in part driven by the search 
for a quicker win, may cause important learning opportunities to be left unused.  
If donors are serious about harvesting the potential of the private sector to contribute to sustainable 
development, they will have to invest in uncovering what works and what doesn’t. With a first generation of 
evaluations on private sector tools in the making, this can be done by investigating how specific approaches 





Are conditions, criteria and requirements scratching the surface? Each of the cases has in some way or 
another illustrated the difficulty of actually targeting the ‘right’ private actors and pushing them to systemic 
change. This challenge has two levels. First there is the issue of selecting what Sweden and Germany call ‘like-
minded’ private sector actors and avoiding private players that will accept the public ODA funds but without 
actually contributing to development. Denmark, Sweden and Germany have formulated conditions and 
requirements for private sector partners. However, as the B2B programme illustrated, operationalisation, 
control and enforcement will need to be equally developed in order for guidelines to have a real effect. This 
makes it necessary to develop a framework of criteria, conditions and requirements, and ‘no-go’s’ for the 
interaction with private actors, but also to investigate how independent control of compliance should be 
arranged and how to act in case of non-compliance. At the same time it will be hard to communicate such a 
framework in a sexy way to private players that often already consider development cooperation as a heavily 
bureaucratized policy domain. 
The second level is about the kind of private sector engagements one hopes to trigger. Having private 
companies contribute (financially or otherwise) is one thing, having them fundamentally changing their 
business practices is another. If the private sector agenda on the rise in current development policy gets stuck 
in the first, this will be a huge missed opportunity.  
  




appendix 1 Overview of data collection  
 
Table 7.1 List of people & institutions who contributed to the research 
Who? Organisation When? How? 
David Maenaut General Representative of the Government 
of Flanders to South Africa (until August 
2014) 
June 2014 Interview 
Katrien Dejongh Attaché Development Cooperation South 
Africa, Flemish Government 
June 2014 Interview, 
Nikolas Bosscher Attaché Development Cooperation 
Malawi, Flemish Government 
September 2014 Interview (phone) 
Patrick De Bouck Head of Development Cooperation at 
Belgian Embassy in South Africa 
June 2014 Interview 
Stephen Miller Country Director at Trias ngo South Africa June 2014 Interview 
Tim Kos Senior Policy Officer Economic Affairs at 
Embassy of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands Pretoria 
June 2014 Interview 
Deirde Van Rooyen Acting Director at Centre for Development 
Support (CDS), University of Free State, 
South Africa 
June 2014 Interview 
David Uwah  Deputy Chairperson at Black Management 
Forum 
June 2014 Interview 
Kerryn Krige Programme Manager Network for Social 
Entrepreneurs, Gordon Institute of 
Business Science (GIBS) 
June 2014 Interview 
Lieve Dillen Policy Advisor International Policies 
Government of Flanders, Environment, 
Nature and Energy Dept, International 
Policy Division 
August 2014 Interview 
Johan Malin Project Manager International 
Organisations at Flanders Investment & 
Trade 
October 2014 Interview 
Caroline Ampe Chief Executive Office at Flanders 
Investment & Trade 
October 2014 Interview 
    
Flemish partners 
 
Foundation for Human Rights; IDC; Trias; 
Parliament Monitoring Group; SEED 
South Africa UNEP; ILO; Bertha Centre; 
Environmentary Monitoring Group;  
Gordon Institute of Business Science 
(GIBS) 











Knowledge centres & 
external stakeholders 
Impact amplifier; GIBS; University of 
Johannesburg; National Planning 
Commission; NEPAD Business 
Foundation; Institute for Security Studies 
3 March 2015 Round table organised by 
IV Pretoria and facilitated 
by GIBS 
Christophe Larose  Head of Section Social Sectors and 
Governance, European Union delegation 
to South Africa 
4 March 2015 
 
Informal exchange with 
Flemish delegation 
Bart van Uythem Head of Economic and Infrastructure 




Head Economic Affairs, Embassy of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands Pretoria 
4 March 2015 Informal exchange with 
Flemish delegation 
Tim Kos Senior Policy Officer Economic Affairs, 
Embassy of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands Pretoria 
Pascal Fröhlicher Impact Amplifier 17 March 2015 Exchange with IV 
Pretoria  
Vic van Vuuren Director, 
ILO Pretoria Office 
18 March 2015 Interview 
Development cooperation 
officers from different EU 
member states 
Development cooperation of Slovakia, 
Finland, Sweden, EU, Germany, Belgium, 
UK, France, Italy 
19 March 2015 Scoping presentation at 





Head of Political-economic Affairs and 
Press & Culture, Political-Economic Team, 
Embassy of Denmark in Pretoria 





Joni Musabayana Deputy Director 
ILO Pretoria Office 
23 March 2015 Interview 
Jens Dyring Christensen Enterprise Development Specialist, ILO 
Pretoria Office 
23 March 2015 Interview 
Valerie Flanagan Chief Technical Advisor, Free State SME 
Development Project, ILO 
24 March 2015 Interview 
Katrien Dejongh Attaché Development Cooperation South 
Africa, Flemish Government 
20 March 2015 Interview 
Geraldine Reymenants General Representative of the Government 
of Flanders to South Africa 
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Jessen Dakile 4.715.893 
Equipment for people with limited 
mobility 
2007 Danverde New Plant Nursery 4.993.508 







2007 Enviscan Ninham Shand 4.306.706 
Consulting engineering company within 
the areas of energy, environment and 
carbon for industrial lines of businesses 
2008  
Consia 






company, core sectors: Road 
Safety & Accident Prevention, 
Roads & Highways, Micro-
finance, Institutional 
Development, Environmental 
Assistance and Education & 
Training 
2008   
Thinggaard 











(Pty) Ltd - Brits (Pty) 
Ltd  
5.011.953  
Develop, build and participate in 
operating manufacturing lines for 
sustainable nonwoven products 
2009   Fibertex A/S Safyr (Pty)   4.959.606  
Fibertex Nonwovens is a 




Oasis Liquor 2.750.165  
Second largest brewery group in 
Denmark 
2010  Develco A/S     
National 
Power Contrators  
4.987.397 
Development company in 





Group A/S  
Strategic 
Environmental 
Focus (Pty) Ltd  
5.065.573  
Danish consulting and planning 
firm located in Denmark, 





Netgroup South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd. 
4.964.752 
Energy trading in Denmark, and market 
participant in the trading of oil and gas 
products. 
2010 Nr Holmgaard ApS Dreamland Farming 4.947.364 / 




Fishing, production and distribution 
2011  Larsen Planet Wise  3.496.387  / 
2011  Medac  Eto Garments  4.947.034  Pharmaceutical company 
2011  Møllerup Gods Hermit Mushrooms  3.196.054  Horeca 















Local company Legal registration and domicile in the B2B country Business licence and annual 
accounts Substantial local ownership and/or management 
Experience in the field of business 
Positive economic results 
The local company must have sufficient resources 




Audited company accounts must show a  Pre-tax profit in at least two 
of the preceding three 
years. 
The equity must make up at least 15% of the 
balance-sheet total. 
Audited accounts for the 
accounting period most 
recently completed 
Company must be credible and creditworthy Not listed with “RKI Kredit 
Information A/S” as a bad 
debtor. 
 
Have operated a business in 
the field covered by the 
cooperation for at least five 
years. Exemptions can be 
made for emerging 
industries. 
Capacity to 
invest?   
Danish 
company 
Company must be of a considerable size to ensure 
that the necessary professional expertise to carry out 
training and technical assistance is found in-house. 
Size, and number of 
permanent employees 




Local company Subsidiaries of Danish companies located in B2B 
countries, or any other company construction 
involving Danish ownership EXCLUDED 
 
Both Long-term business perspective, commercially 
interesting partnership to both partners 
 
Corporate ethics Both 
companies 
Respect for human rights, companies must take 
proactive approach to become aware of, prevent 
and address any adverse human rights impacts 
connected with their business activities. 
 
The applications 
Respect for workers’ rights 





Production of alcoholic beverages (including 
beer), tobacco and weapons EXCLUDED from 
support 
 
Additionality Explanation and 
demonstration in the 
application document 




Increased employment opportunities for youth 
and women 
The applicant companies 
must address the 
development impact 
criteria in their application 
Improvement in external and working 
environment 
Promotion of CSR (regarding HIV/AIDS, sound 
business practices, equal opportunities and 
workers’ and human rights) 
Source (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2010; Danida n.d.; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 
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The Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies coordinates a Policy Research 
Centre on "Foreign Affairs, International Entrepreneurship and Development 
Cooperation" for the Flemish Government. A Policy Support Centre aims to 
scientifically support Flemish regional policies. The project brings together 17 senior 
and 10 junior researchers (including eight PhD students). 
The Centre conducts (a) data collection and analysis, and provides (b) short-term 
policy supporting research, (c) fundamental scientific research and (d) scientific 
services. 
The Policy Research Centre is based on an inter-university consortium led by the 
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (www.globalgovernancestudies.eu) in 
cooperation with the Antwerp Centre for Institutions and Multilevel Politics,  the Vlerick 
Leuven Gent Management School and the H.U.Brussel. Within the KU Leuven, 
colleagues from the Faculty of Business and Economics, the HIVA - Research Institute 
for Work and Society, the Institute for International and European Policy, the Research 
Unit International and Foreign Law, the Institute for International Law, and the Institute 
for European Law are also involved in the project. 
Research is structured in four thematic pillars: (i) International and European Law; (ii) 
International and European Policy; (iii) International Entrepreneurship; and (iv) 
Development Cooperation. 
For more information, see our website: www.steunpuntiv.eu  
NEDERLANDS 
Het Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (www.globalgovernancestudies.eu) 
coördineert de derde generatie van het Steunpunt “Buitenlands beleid, internationaal 
ondernemen en ontwikkelingssamenwerking” voor de Vlaamse Regering. Een 
Steunpunt heeft als doel de wetenschappelijke ondersteuning van Vlaams beleid. 
Het project brengt 17 promotoren en 10 junior onderzoekers (waarvan acht 
doctoraatsstudenten) samen. Het Steunpunt doet aan (a) dataverzameling en -
analyse, (b) korte termijn beleidsondersteunend wetenschappelijk onderzoek, (c) 
fundamenteel wetenschappelijk onderzoek en (d) wetenschappelijke dienstverlening. 
We werken samen met een aantal partners: het Antwerp Centre for Institutions and 
Multilevel Politics, de Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School en H.U.Brussel. 
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